Uganda’s Special Forces Command, a highly trained elite military unit, is increasingly acting as a private army to maintain President Yoweri Museveni’s decades-long rule, with recent reports underscoring its role in suppressing political opposition and its controversial elevation to official military status.
Toting sub-machine guns and sometimes masked, members of Uganda’s Special Forces Command (SFC) patrol the streets, viewed by critics as a shadow army dedicated to preserving the power of 81-year-old President Yoweri Museveni and his family dynasty. Museveni, who seized power in 1986, has won multiple elections amid allegations of violence and rigging, with the SFC playing a key role in intimidating opponents. The unit, established early in his reign, has a motto emphasizing loyalty and is accused of operating outside normal military chains of command. Its influence has grown so much that it now rivals the regular army in power and resources, raising concerns about its unchecked authority and impact on Uganda’s political landscape.
The SFC has been commanded for years by Museveni’s son, General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, who now serves as army chief and has expressed ambitions to succeed his father. Under his leadership, the SFC expanded to an estimated 10,000 members, equipped with sophisticated weapons and specialized training, while the regular army has about 40,000 personnel. Gen Kainerugaba is credited with strengthening the unit, but his controversial statements, such as joking about invading Kenya, have caused alarm. He maintains de facto control over the SFC even after his promotion, operating from its headquarters in Entebbe, which fuels perceptions of a dynastic rule.
Critics accuse the SFC of systematic human rights abuses, including abductions, torture, and killings of opposition activists throughout the year, not just during elections. The unit denies these allegations, but incidents like the court-martial of an SFC soldier sentenced to death for shooting civilians highlight ongoing issues. In May, the presidency investigated SFC soldiers for torturing a motorbike taxi driver caught in a presidential convoy, and Gen Kainerugaba confirmed detaining an opposition bodyguard, mocking him on social media. The Uganda Law Society condemned these actions as part of a campaign to silence dissent, underscoring a dangerous blend of military and political oppression.
Recent developments include the SFC’s suspected cross-border operation into Kenya to capture opposition figure Kizza Besigye, who faces treason charges, and its official recognition by parliament in June as one of Uganda’s four military services. Opposition MPs argued this legitimizes an illegal entity and called for its disbandment, but analysts say the move merely codifies the SFC’s dominant role in regime security. Dr. Gerald Bareebe, a Uganda-born academic, notes that the SFC’s core function is to guarantee Museveni’s survival by fending off internal and external threats, reinforcing its position as a cornerstone of the president’s grip on power.
Internally, the SFC faces resentment from senior generals in the regular army, who feel sidelined by its rise. Sources report that recruitment is biased towards Museveni’s Banyankore ethnic group and related communities to ensure loyalty, with most commanders hailing from western Uganda. This ethnic favoritism has sparked discontent and fears of factionalism within the military, echoing concerns from other African nations like Sudan, where rival military groups have triggered civil war. A senior army officer, speaking anonymously, cited growing unease over the unit’s opaque recruitment processes.
Analysts warn that a power struggle could erupt between the SFC and the regular army after Museveni’s departure, given their competing loyalties and interests. Opposition MP Ibrahim Ssemujju Nganda expressed fear over the uncertainty in a post-Museveni era, while Dr. Bareebe highlighted the risk of instability or violence without a clear succession plan. However, some observers believe Gen Kainerugaba could bridge the divide and ensure continuity, though this would be seen as undemocratic, underscoring the fragile stability in Uganda where power has historically changed hands through force.
Opposition leaders, such as former pop star Bobi Wine, describe the SFC as a ‘torture squad’ and report frequent targeting and beatings by its officers. Bobi Wine, who is challenging Museveni in next year’s election, has called for the unit’s dissolution, citing its impunity and protection by the Museveni family. Earlier this year, Gen Kainerugaba threatened to behead him in a since-deleted tweet, illustrating the tense political climate and the SFC’s role in suppressing democratic aspirations.
In conclusion, the SFC’s evolution into a powerful, loyalist force highlights the militarization of Uganda’s politics and raises questions about the country’s democratic future. As Museveni seeks re-election and his son positions himself as a successor, the unit’s role in maintaining an iron grip on power could deepen divisions and increase the risk of instability, with the international community and local activists urging accountability and respect for human rights to prevent further escalation.