The Trump administration’s ‘Donroe doctrine’ marks a decisive shift in U.S. policy to actively counter China’s expanding influence across Latin America, underscored by recent military intervention in Venezuela and pressure on Chinese-led infrastructure projects, setting the stage for intensified geopolitical rivalry in the Western Hemisphere.
China has spent over two decades deepening its ties with Latin America, transforming from a minor trade partner into a pivotal economic force through massive investments in infrastructure, energy, and mining. Trade between China and the region now exceeds half a trillion dollars annually, with Chinese firms dominating key sectors like lithium extraction in Chile and Argentina, copper mining in Peru, and telecommunications in several countries. This economic penetration has been accompanied by growing political influence, helping Beijing sway diplomatic recognition away from Taiwan.
The U.S. response has crystallized into the ‘Donroe doctrine,’ a modern twist on the Monroe Doctrine that explicitly aims to curb non-Western powers in the Americas. Articulated in a December national security strategy, it pledges to ‘deny non-Hemispheric competitors’ control of strategic assets. President Trump has framed this as reclaiming U.S. dominance, citing actions in Venezuela to prevent Chinese and Russian footholds.
Recent events have brought this strategy into sharp focus. The surprise U.S. military strike that ousted Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro earlier this month directly targeted a key Chinese ally, jeopardizing billions in Chinese loans and oil projects. Simultaneously, U.S. pressure contributed to Panama’s Supreme Court annulling port contracts held by a Hong Kong-linked firm at the Panama Canal, a move Beijing condemned as undermining bilateral ties.
Chinese projects across the region are now under heightened scrutiny. Ports like Chancay in Peru, majority-owned by China’s COSCO shipping giant, are viewed by U.S. officials as potential dual-use infrastructure that could be militarized in conflicts. While these projects offer economic benefits, such as reduced shipping times, the U.S. frames them as strategic vulnerabilities. Chinese firms have also faced local challenges, but their deep pockets and state backing often outmatch U.S. private sector interest.
Latin American countries are navigating this rivalry with caution. Experts warn that U.S. demands to avoid Chinese infrastructure investment could hinder regional development, effectively telling nations to ‘stay underdeveloped.’ Governments are assessing their vulnerability to pressure, with some, like Panama, adjusting policies under U.S. sway. However, there is skepticism about Washington’s ability to offer viable alternatives, as U.S. investment often lacks the scale of China’s state-driven model.
In response, China has recalibrated its approach, emphasizing development cooperation and economic resilience. A new policy paper on Latin America proposes enhanced collaboration in green energy, agriculture, and technology while criticizing ‘unilateral bullying.’ Beijing has also dispatched naval hospital ships to the region, projecting a benevolent image contrasted with U.S. militarism. Analysts suggest China may shift focus to less contentious sectors but is unlikely to retreat.
The unfolding competition underscores a pivotal moment for Latin America, where long-term economic partnerships with China clash with renewed U.S. hegemony. The outcome will depend on whether Washington can provide attractive alternatives and whether regional governments can leverage the rivalry to their advantage, with implications for global supply chains and stability.
