Executive summary: Prashant Kishor’s political start-up, Jan Suraaj, failed to win any seats in the recent Bihar elections, underscoring the difficulties new parties face in breaking into India’s entrenched political system. Despite significant media buzz and a data-driven campaign, the party could not overcome voters’ loyalty to established parties.
Prashant Kishor, once a renowned political strategist for leaders like Narendra Modi and Nitish Kumar, launched Jan Suraaj with the aim of ending Bihar’s stagnation through a modern, governance-focused approach. He spent two years walking across the state, building an organization and fielding candidates in nearly all 243 seats, generating substantial media attention. However, in the November 2025 elections, Jan Suraaj failed to secure a single seat, garnering only a small fraction of the vote as the BJP-led alliance swept to power.
The outcome reflects a broader trend in Indian politics, where very few new parties achieve relevance without existing social bases or mass movements. Historically, successful entrants like the Telugu Desam Party or Aam Aadmi Party emerged from socio-political crises or breakaway factions, whereas Jan Suraaj was conceived as an intellectual project. According to political analysts, the party lacked the organic, movement-based energy needed to resonate with voters, who remained pragmatic and stuck to traditional loyalties in the absence of widespread anti-incumbency.
Jan Suraaj’s failure can be attributed to several factors, including its inability to build a natural social base around caste, religion, or other constituencies that dominate Bihar’s politics. Despite Kishor’s articulate campaigning and focus on issues like jobs, migration, and education, voters did not see the party as a viable alternative. Experts note that the party had recognition but no grassroots strength, highlighting a gap between visibility and electoral success.
In contrast, parties like the Aam Aadmi Party succeeded by riding on anti-corruption movements and having leaders like Arvind Kejriwal contest seats personally, which built emotional connections with voters. Kishor’s decision not to run for office himself may have undermined credibility, as it suggested he was conducting an experiment rather than offering a committed alternative. This lack of a relatable, risk-taking leader limited the party’s appeal, even though its agenda was coherent and addressed key state issues.
Political scientist Rahul Verma emphasizes that start-ups, whether in business or politics, fail more often than they succeed, and building a party requires visibility, organization, mobilization, and trustworthy candidates—all challenging without a track record. Jan Suraaj fielded many first-time candidates, which further complicated its efforts to gain voter trust. The verdict underscores that media hype alone cannot substitute for ground-level organization and deep-rooted support.
Looking ahead, Kishor has indicated plans to remain in Bihar and strengthen Jan Suraaj’s grassroots presence. Analysts suggest that if the party can maintain engagement, cultivate local leadership, and avoid post-election dormancy, it might gradually convert attention into influence. With Bihar’s political landscape evolving and traditional loyalties shifting, there is potential for Jan Suraaj to become a meaningful force by the 2030 elections, provided Kishor takes a more front-line political role.
Ultimately, the failure of Jan Suraaj reveals that Indian voters, while increasingly issue-sensitive, prioritize practicality and the likelihood of success when casting their ballots. The episode serves as a cautionary tale for political entrepreneurs, illustrating that breaking into the system requires more than strategic insight—it demands emotional resonance, credible leadership, and sustained grassroots effort to overcome entrenched patterns.
